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1Abstract
We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for observed outcomes
in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be ra-
tionalized ﬁrst, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these condi-
tions to ﬁnd that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium,
or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with
Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.
Keywords: Revealed Preference, Consistency, Subgame-Perfect Equi-
librium.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, C92.
21 INTRODUCTION
How can one test whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium when
we cannot observe the players’ preferences? As a number of recent papers
(Zhou 1997, Sprumont 2000, Ray and Zhou 2001, Sprumont 2001, Bossert and
Sprumont 2002, , Zhou 2002, Bossert and Sprumont 2003, Carvajal 2003) have
discussed, one can observe the outcome in a variety of game forms and extend
the lessons of revealed preference theory for individual choice to concepts of
equilibrium play in games.
Sprumont (2000) has taken up the issue for normal form games. Sprumont
considers ﬁnite sets of actions, Ai, one for each player, i; the product set, A,i s
called the set of joint actions. A joint choice function, f, assigns to every possible
subset B of A a non-empty set. A data set is a realization of a joint choice
function. A data set is Nash rationalizable if there exist preference orderings
on A such that for every B, f(B) coincides with the set of Nash equilibria for
the game deﬁned by the set of actions B with those preferences. Sprumont
provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions (Persistence under Expansion and
Persistence under Contraction) for a data set in a normal game form to be Nash
rationalizable.
As a complement to the work of Sprumont, Ray and Zhou (2001) consider
situations in which the players move sequentially with perfect information. They
ﬁx an extensive game form (tree) G with complete information. A reduced game
form, G0, is obtained from G by deleting branches of G. A unique outcome is
observed for each reduced game form. For Ray and Zhou, the data are the out-
comes of all possible reduced game forms. They provide necessary and suﬃcient
conditions (Acyclicity of the Base Relation, Internal Consistency and Subgame
Consistency) for a data set in an extensive game form to be rationalizable as
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in every reduced game form.
We are interested in the diﬀerences between Nash and subgame-perfect be-
havior in extensive games. Notice that in extensive game forms, we assume that
we observe outcomes and not strategies (complete plans of actions), whereas in
3the work on normal game forms, strategies (equivalently, actions) are assumed
to be observed. Thus, a data set in an extensive game form has missing obser-
vations compared to the corresponding normal form data set. Therefore, one
cannot use Sprumont’s conditions for Nash rationalization in an extensive game
form by testing the conditions in the corresponding normal game form. To see
this, consider the data set from the game tree (and all reduced forms) as in
Figure 1a. The tree has two choice nodes; player 1 moves in the ﬁrst node and
has two choices, namely L and R. Player 2 moves in the second (after player
1 moves L) and also has two choices, namely l and r. There are 3 possible
(non-trivial) reduced game forms as shown in the ﬁgure.
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
The corresponding normal game form obviously has a 2x2 structure as shown
in Figure 1b. There are 4 possible (non-trivial) reduced normal forms. Clearly,
if we observe the outcomes in the trees G, G1, G2, and G3, we do not observe
player 2’s choice of action when player 1 chooses to play R in the corresponding
normal game form G4.
It is indeed possible to observe data in extensive game forms that are not
rationalizable by subgame-perfect equilibrium, yet can still be rationalized as
Nash behavior. Consider for example, the following two distinct data sets, as
described in Figures 2a and 2b, on the same game trees as in Figure 1a.
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b here]
Neither of these data sets satisﬁes the subgame consistency condition of Ray
and Zhou and therefore cannot be rationalized as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The data in Figure 2a, however, can be rationalized by a Nash equilibrium.
The choice of player 1 to play R in the game form G can be justiﬁed as a
Nash behavior on his part that assumes that player 2 would play r (although
actually, player 2 prefers to play l when given the choice).1 The data in Figure
1This is precisely the case of “incredible threat” often used to show the diﬀerence between
Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium in extensive form games.
42b, however, cannot be rationalized even by Nash equilibrium as there is no
choice of player 2 that could justify player 1’s choice of playing R in the game
form G.
Also, notice that, under the (revealed) preferences that rationalize the out-
comes in Figure 2a, the game G has multiple Nash equilibria. There is a Nash
equilibrium (indeed, subgame-perfect) outcome (L, l) in the game, which how-
ever is not observed, as we assume that only one outcome is observed in each
reduced game form.
In this paper, we ﬁrst provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for partial
Nash rationalization; i.e., we rationalize the data in each reduced game as one
of the possibly multiple Nash equilibria. For each game form G0, we consider
strategies that are consistent with the observed outcome in the reduced game.
If there exist strict preferences such that any one of these strategies can be
shown to be a best response for each player i, given that the other players’
strategies are ﬁxed, then clearly the observed outcome is consistent with Nash
behavior. This motivates our necessary and suﬃcient condition, called Extensive
Form Consistency, which compares the outcomes of a set of reduced extensive
form games, varying the set of feasible strategies for one player while the other
players’ strategies are ﬁxed. For example, in the data in Figure 2b, there are
two strategies consistent with the given outcome in the game form G, namely,
(R,l) and (R,r); if we ﬁx player 2’s strategy at either l or r, we see from the
outcomes of the reduced games G2 and G3, that player 1 prefers to play L. Our
extensive form consistency is not satisﬁed here and R cannot be rationalized as
Nash behavior in game G. In the data set in Figure 2a, the condition is satisﬁed
and the outcome in game G can be rationalized using the strategy proﬁle (R,r),
as from G3, player 1 prefers to play R.
We then provide a condition, Subgame-Perfect Consistency, which uses ob-
servations of reduced game outcomes that are proper subgames below a node
with at least one active player other than the one at that node, to ensure that
the strategies played are consistent with not only Nash but also with subgame-
perfect behavior. The data set in Figure 2a does not satisfy this condition
5because player 2 is active in G1, which is a proper subgame of G, and is ob-
served to move l; under this circumstance, we know from G2, player 1 prefers L
to R. Thus the outcome R in G violates subgame-perfect consistency.
2 ANALYSIS
2.1 Set-up
We study n-person extensive form games with perfect information. The struc-
ture is identical to that in Ray and Zhou (2001). We therefore maintain their
terminologies and the notations as much as possible.
An extensive game form G is a ﬁnite rooted tree with set of nodes, X, with
a distinct initial node x0,a n daprecedence function p : X/x0 → X.I fp(y)=x,
then x is called an immediate predecessor of y. Also y is called an immediate
successor of x,o ry ∈ s(x). Let S(x) denote the set of all successors of x.A
node z is called a terminal node, or an outcome, if there exists no x ∈ X such
that p(x)=z. The set of all terminal nodes is Z. A path ρ is a ﬁnite sequence of
nodes: (xk : k =0 ,...,m) where xk = p(xk+1) for each k and xm is a terminal
node. A path leading to a terminal node xm, ρ(xm), can be uniquely identiﬁed.
The set of non-terminal nodes, X/Z, are partitioned into n subsets, {X1,
X2,..., Xn}, where Xi, called the player i’s partition, is the set of nodes at which
player i moves; player i’s moves determine one y ∈ s(x) for each x ∈ Xi. A pure
strategy ti for player i speciﬁes a unique choice at each node in Xi. The set of
pure strategies available to player i is Ti.
Deﬁnition 1 A reduced extensive game form G0 of an extensive game form G
is an extensive game form consisting of (i) terminal nodes Z0 ⊆ Z and (ii) all
the non-terminal nodes that belong to ρ(z0) for any z0 ∈ Z0.
Thus, any set of terminal nodes Z0uniquely refers to the reduced game form
G0. As with G, the set of non-terminal nodes in G0 can also be partitioned into
n many player-partitions, {X0
1,..., X0
n}.
6Let Γ be the set of all possible reduced extensive game forms of an extensive
game form G.
Player i is active in any (reduced) game form G0 if X0
i is non-empty with at
least one node x ∈ X0
i such that |s(x)|≥2.
Deﬁnition 2 For each reduced extensive game form G0 and a non-terminal
node x ∈ X0/Z0, the subgame form beginning at x, G0
x, is the reduced extensive
game form consisting of (i) terminal nodes Z0(x)=Z0 ∩ S(x) and (ii) all the
non-terminal nodes that belong to ρ(z0) for any z0 ∈ Z0 ∩ S(x).2
A pure strategy t0
i for player i in G0 speciﬁes a unique choice of an immediate
successor y ∈ s(x) at each node x in X0
i. The set of pure strategies available to
player i is T 0
i. Clearly, although Z0 ⊆ Z, T 0
i may not be a subset of Ti.
For any (reduced) extensive game form G0 a strategy proﬁle t0 =( t0
1,...,t 0
n)
determines an outcome Ω(t0)=z0, where Ω : ΠiT 0
i → Z0.




i ⊆ T 0
i for all i be non-empty sets of pure strategies. A strategy-reduced
extensive game form G00 is an extensive game form consisting of (i) terminal
nodes Z00 ⊆ Z0 with z00 ∈ Z00 such that z00 =Ω ( t00) for some t00 ∈ ΠiT 00
i and (ii)
all the non-terminal nodes that belong to ρ(z00) for any z00 ∈ Z00.
Clearly, a strategy-reduced extensive game form G00 is a reduced game form
(of the original game G).3 Starting from G0 ∈ Γ and a ﬁxed strategy proﬁle
t0, we then look at a set of strategy-reduced extensive game forms in which the
2The subgame form G0
x is thus the reduced game form consisting of the path from x0 to x
and the subgame below the node x.
3Another way to look at the strategy-reduced extensive game forms is to consider the
corresponding normal form representations. Formally, from a reduced extensive game form
G0, one can uniquely deﬁne a normal game form H0 as the set of players (1,...,n), the set
of strategies for each player T 0
i, and the function Ω : (t0
1,...,t 0
n) → Z0. A reduced normal
game form H00 of a normal game form H0 consists of a list hT 00
1 ,...,T00
ni of nonempty subsets
T 00
i ⊆ T 0
i for all i and the corresponding outcomes Ω(t00). From every H00 one can then
uniquely deﬁne a corresponding extensive game form G00 deﬁned by Z00 ⊆ Z with z00 ∈ Z00 iﬀ
z00 =Ω ( t00) for some t00 ∈h T 00
1 ,...,T00
ni.
7other players’ strategies are ﬁxed, while varying the set of feasible strategies for
player k maintaining the strategy t0
k feasible.
Deﬁnition 4 For any G0 ∈ Γ and the corresponding pure strategy sets hT 0
1,...,T 0
ni,
given a t0 =( t0
1,...,t 0
n) where t0
i ∈ T 0
i, and a particular player k, an individually-
strategy-reduced extensive game form G00(t0,k) is a strategy-reduced extensive
game form with t0
k ∈ T 00
k ⊆ T 0
k, and T 00
j = t0
j for all j 6= k.
Deﬁnition 5 A binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form G00(t0,k;2)
is an individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form consisting of |Z00| =2 .
Suppose each player i has preferences over Z described as a strict ordering
Q∗
i over Z. Let the players play reduced games G0(Q∗) for every G0 ∈ Γ. Let
O :Γ → Z be the outcome function. We observe O(G0) ∈ Z0 and thus the
unique path ρ(O(G0)) for every G0 ∈ Γ. We do not observe strategies; thus
players’ intended moves oﬀ the path cannot be observed.
Deﬁnition 6 An outcome function O is partially rationalized by Nash equilib-
rium in strict preferences if for all i, there exists Qi over Z such that O(G0)
coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the game G0(Q) for every G0 ∈ Γ.
Similarly, an outcome function O is fully rationalized by subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in strict preferences if for all i, there exists Qi over Z such
that O(G0) coincides with the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
game G0(Q) for every G0 ∈ Γ.
2.2 Conditions
Condition 1 Extensive Form Consistency (XC): For any G0 ∈ Γ and the cor-
responding pure strategy sets hT 0
1,...,T0
ni with the outcome O(G0)=z0, there
exists a t∗ =( t∗
1,...,t ∗
n) with t∗
i ∈ T 0
i for all i and Ω(t∗)=z0 such that for all
i, for all binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game forms G00(t∗,i;2),
O(G00(t∗,i;2)) = z0.
8Condition 2 Subgame-perfect Consistency (SPC): For each game G0, consider
each non-terminal node x ∈ X0/Z0 such that x ∈ ρ(O(G0)) with player i such
that x ∈ Xi. For each non-terminal node y ∈ s(x) such that (i) y/ ∈ ρ(O(G0),





Given an outcome function O, following Ray and Zhou (2001), one can construct
incomplete preference orderings for players over the terminal nodes. Consider
the paths that lead to two diﬀerent terminal nodes u and v. Take the player i
who has to play at the node where these two paths diverge. Player i’s preference
over u and v can be determined by his choice in the reduced game form G0 which
has only two terminal nodes, u and v. This incomplete order, Pi, for player i,
is known as the revealed base relation. Formally, for any u, v ∈ Z, let x be the
node at which the paths to u and v diverge. If x ∈ Xi, then uPiv if and only
if u = O(G0), where G0 is the reduced game form which has only two terminal
nodes, u and v.
Lemma 1 If XC is satisﬁed, then the revealed base relation is acyclic.4
Proof. Suppose we have a cycle in the revealed base relation for some player
i involving the terminal nodes z1, z2, ..., zk such that z1Piz2Pi ...z kPiz1. Con-
sider the reduced extensive game form G0 characterized by the set of terminal
nodes Z0 =( z1,z 2,...,z k). This is clearly a game form where only player i is
active and chooses among the nodes in Z0. Wlog, suppose, O(G0)=z1. Now XC
implies that the outcome in the individually-strategy-reduced extensive game
form consisting only of z1 and zk is z1, which contradicts zkPiz1. Hence we
cannot have a cycle in the revealed base relation.
Lemma 2 An acyclic base relation can be extended to a strict ordering on Z
which is complete and acyclic (equivalently, transitive, for a complete ordering)
4Ray and Zhou (2001) take acyclicity as one of their conditions.
9for each player i.
Proof. We are omitting the proof here. It follows from a routine argument
using Zorn’s lemma (cf. Richter 1966, Theorem 1).5
2.4 Results
Theorem 1 XC is necessary and suﬃcient for partial Nash rationalization in
strict preferences.6
Proof. Necessity is straightforward and hence we only show suﬃciency
here. From the previous lemmas we know that if XC is satisﬁed, we can deﬁne
a complete transitive strict ordering Qi on Z for all i that is consistent with
the base preference relation Pi. We will show, for each game G0, there exists
a strategy proﬁle such that the outcome corresponding to the proﬁle is the
observed outcome O(G0) and that the strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium of




i ∈ T 0
i for all i and Ω(t∗)=O(G0) satisfying XC. If every player follows this
strategy, then the outcome is O(G0). Let us show that these strategies indeed
constitute a Nash equilibrium for every G0. Suppose any player i deviates and
plays any other strategy e t0
i to induce a diﬀerent outcome e z0. By XC, the outcome
of the binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form G00(t∗,i;2) with
Z00 = {e z0, z0} is z0. Hence, by the revealed base relation, z0Pie z0 implying z0Qie z0.
Therefore player i cannot deviate and be better oﬀ.
Theorem 2 XC and SPC together are necessary and suﬃcient for full ratio-
nalization by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in strict preferences.
Proof. Once again, necessity is straightforward and hence we only show
suﬃciency here. From the previous theorem we know that for each game G0,
there exists a t∗ =( t∗
1,...,t ∗
n) with t∗
i ∈ T 0
i for all i and Ω(t∗)=O(G0) that
5See the ﬁrst part of the proof of the main theorem in Ray and Zhou (2001).
6This theorem is the extensive game form analog of Sprumont’s Theorem 3 for normal
form games.
10constitutes a Nash equilibrium for every G0. We will prove that these outcomes
coincide with the outcomes of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that can
be constructed using the complete transitive revealed strict ordering Qi as in
Lemma 2. Suppose this is not true. Then there must exist a reduced game G0
in which there exists a node x such that these outcomes do not constitute a
subgame perfect equilibrium for the subgame form beginning at x, G0
x, but they
do for G0
w, for all w ∈ s(x). For, if such an x does not exist, we would be able
to ﬁnd an inﬁnite sequence of nodes {xk} with xk = p(xk+1), for each k, which
contradicts the assumption that the game always ends. Suppose at G0
x, player
i is active, that is, x ∈ X0
i. As play at G0
x is not subgame-perfect but is for all
subgames succeeding x, then it must be true that, given Qi, player i can deviate
at x from the outcome path ρ(O(G0)) and obtain an outcome that he prefers to
O(G0). If x/ ∈ ρ(O(G0)) then player i cannot change the outcome by deviating
at x. So let us assume x ∈ ρ(O(G0)). Suppose player i deviates and moves to
a successor y ∈ s(x) such that y/ ∈ ρ(O(G0). If y is a terminal node then con-
sider the binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form G00(t∗,i;2)
with Z00 = {O(G0), y}.I fy is a non-terminal node and the subgame G0
y has
player i as the only active player then consider the binary individually-strategy-
reduced extensive game form G00(t∗,i;2) with Z00 = {O(G0), O(G0
y)}. By XC,
the outcome of either binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form
is O(G0). Hence, by the revealed base relation, player i cannot deviate and be
better oﬀ. Now suppose y is a non-terminal node and the subgame G0
y has at
least one active player other than i. Then by SPC, O(O(G0),O(G0
y)) = O(G0).
Therefore, again by the revealed base relation, player i cannot deviate and be
better oﬀ.7
7As in Ray and Zhou’s (2001) proof, this argument uses the one deviation property (as in
Lemma 98.2 of Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) which is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for subgame-perfect equilibrium.
113 CONCLUSION
In this paper we provide separate testable restrictions for Nash and subgame-
perfect equilibrium. Our two conditions together are equivalent to the three
conditions proposed by Ray and Zhou for subgame-perfect rationalization. The
advantage however is that our conditions can be used to test for Nash behavior
alone and also to distinguish between Nash and subgame-perfect behavior.
Our conditions are also constructed in such a way that violations of these
conditions refer speciﬁcally to players and nodes. Checking these conditions can
help identify the players and the nodes where subgame-perfect or Nash behavior
are not observed. Thus, even though the data come from a collective choice
situation of a multi-player game, we can recover information about individual
rationality. This could be relevant to obtain results to rationalize observed
outcomes using other notions of rationality such as multiple rationales (Kalai,
Rubinstein and Spiegler, 2002).
One possible criticism of our test for Nash behavior could be that the re-
strictions are described over observable outcomes and unobservable strategies.
Note that, however, for the class of games we consider, the set of unobservable
strategies that are consistent with an observed outcome is ﬁnite. Thus, the tests
can be carried out in ﬁnitely many steps for a given data set. Tests of this form
have been used in the previous literature. For example, Diewert and Parkan
(1985) developed nonparametric tests that require checking whether there ex-
ists a real solution to a (linear) programming problem deﬁned over observed
and unobserved variables.
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